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ABSTRACT
Many Chicagoans are getting shortchanged, particularly when it comes to the
money-exchange process between the Illinois Lottery (IL) and the Illinois State Board of
Education (ISBE). In Illinois, a significant portion of lottery-generated revenues is
earmarked to finance public education. Because these revenues are not generated equally
across Chicago, some communities contribute more to education via the lottery than
others. When these revenues are distributed in such a way that transfers money from one
community to another, one community’s fiscal gain comes at another’s expense. So the
question stands: Who plays and who pays? To answer this question, I measure the
economic incidence of the money-exchange process between the IL and ISBE. My focus,
however, is limited to the city of Chicago as a case study. In other words, I
simultaneously compare the generation of lottery revenues to the appropriations of these
funds, all within the city limits of Chicago. My hypothesis, or wager if you will, predicts
that the money-exchange process, between the IL and ISBE, transfers resources from
marginalized to mainstream communities, and that this process is inherently racialized. I
estimate that lottery-generated revenues disproportionately come from communities that
are predominately comprised by people of color, specifically blacks and Latina/os. These
funds are then redistributed in such a way that racially marginalized communities
subsidize education, a public service to which everyone is entitled.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE LOTTERY: A MECHANISM FOR REPRODUCING RACIAL INEQUALITY
Many Chicagoans are getting shortchanged, particularly when it comes to the
money-exchange process between the Illinois Lottery (IL) and Illinois State Board of
Education (ISBE). In Illinois, a significant portion of lottery-generated revenues is
earmarked to finance public education. Because these revenues are not generated equally
across Chicago, some communities contribute more to education via the lottery than
others. When these revenues are distributed in such a way that transfers money from one
community to another, one community’s fiscal gain comes at another’s expense. So the
question stands: Who plays and who pays?
To answer this question, I measure the economic incidence of the moneyexchange process between the IL and ISBE. My focus, however, is limited to the city of
Chicago as a case study. In other words, I simultaneously compare the generation of
lottery revenues to the appropriations of these funds, all within the city limits of Chicago.
My hypothesis, or wager if you will, predicts that the money-exchange process, between
the IL and ISBE, transfers resources from marginalized to mainstream communities, and
that this process is inherently racialized. I estimate that lottery-generated revenues
disproportionately come from communities that are predominately comprised by people
of color, specifically blacks and Hispanics, and then these funds are redistributed and
spread across other communities throughout the city.
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At face value, the interactive relationship between the IL and ISBE may seem
race-neutral and colorblind. After all, no one group is required to play the lottery more
than another, and the legal provisions governing the IL and ISBE are not racially explicit.
This, however, does not negate the potential for these institutions’ interactive relationship
to be deeply racialized. This is particularly true when money is taken from communities
of color then redistributed across other communities, especially predominately white
ones. If my wager is correct, then the means by which Illinois funds public education is
neither equitable nor progressive. Instead, this money-exchange process represents an
inherently racialized state policy that can exacerbate racial inequalities by reproducing
white privilege and nonwhite burden, particularly for blacks and Hispanics.
Now that my hypothesis has been proposed, let me outline the organization of my
argument that follows. This thesis is organized in four parts: a brief literature review, my
methodological approach, an analysis of racialized economic incidence, and a concluding
statement about state-sponsored racism. In the first section, I discuss the widespread
popularity of state lotteries, their general purpose, and the nature of their operation. Much
of my focus, given the purpose of my investigation, is centered on the state of Illinois.
The second section previews what methodological steps I take to complete the study. I
detail my research design ranging from how data was collected and analyzed. In the next
section, I simultaneously analyze the generation and appropriation of lottery revenues.
For the last section, I situate my argument within the larger literary context of racism and
highlight how the state constitutes a mechanism for reproducing inequality via the lottery.

CHAPTER TWO
HIGH STAKES PUBLIC FINANCING:
SITUATING THE ILLINOIS LOTTERY IN A NEO-LIBERAL CONTEXT
Neo-liberalism fosters an environment in which lotteries thrive. It has spurred
both the economic and social disinvestment of the welfare state, in which support for
public services such as healthcare, housing, and education has been withdrawn. While
neo-liberal ideology rationalizes why the welfare state should wither, neo-liberal
economic theory has restructured modes of production across not only the U.S. but the
globe. Considering these combined factors, it becomes easier to understand why many
Americans resent taxes for public services and how many of these same people lack
ample means to pay for these services. Such a situation has left governments, particularly
those at the state level, in positions where they must look to alternative sources of capital
to finance the public sector. For many state governments, lotteries present an opportunity
to generate large sums of money to fill budgetary shortfalls. Millions of dollars can be
raised with little resistance, as no mandatory taxes are imposed upon the people. After all,
lotteries are among Americans’ favorite form of gambling.
Social Aspects of Neo-Liberalism
When former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said, “There is no such
thing as society” (see Kealy 1987:9) these words became a mantra for neo-liberal
thought. Though it is common to speak of neo-liberalism strictly in market terms,
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Thatcher’s words demonstrate that it cannot be narrowly defined as such. Neo-liberalism
is as much a social and cultural phenomenon as it is an economic one. Brown (2003)
aptly captures this point when she points out that catchphrases such as “free trade,”
“maximized competition,” “de-regulation,” “privatization,” and the “invisible hand” can
be extended and disseminated “to all institutions and social actions” (p. 7).
If society does not exist, the world is comprised of nothing more than individual.
This is a logical conclusion of neo-liberal principles applied to social thought, and this
conclusion has strong political implications. When opportunities and circumstances are
not socially derived, individuals become responsible for their own position in life. Social
forces such as history, power, and inequality are divorced from constraining and enabling
individual choices. Not only are they divorced, but they are erased from existence.
Inequitable distributions of power, resources, and opportunity cannot be a plausible
explanation for group disparities, because the failure to provide of one’s own needs
becomes personalized. Opportunities for material attainment are assumed to be available
to everyone, just as long as one works hard enough and makes proper investment for the
future.
When neo-liberal thinking is conflated with organizing the government, a natural
consequence is the erosion of public services as we know them (Smith 2007). People do
not want to fund what they see as a “free ticket” for people who prefer to remain
dependent upon public support rather than be self-sufficient, especially when these
“freeloaders” are assumed to be black and poor (Gilens 1999; Neubeck and Cazenave
2001). Despite the fact that the United States has the lowest tax rates of any industrialized
nation (Nibert 2000), American anti-tax resentment, rationalized by neo-liberal thought,
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flourishes for such reasons. Such resentment has produced tangible results in the U.S. tax
code too.
Since the “taxpayer revolt” of the 1970s, both federal and state revenues have
steadily declined, with those occupying higher class statuses (in terms of both wealth and
income) receiving the most tax relief (Nibert 2000). What this means is that taxes have
taken on a more regressive nature in which marginalized groups pay higher proportions
of their income and wealth than do affluent groups and corporations. Not only has this
burdened marginalized groups with an unfair share of taxation, but it has reduced the
money pool available for federal and state government finance.
Economic Aspects of Neo-Liberalism
The money pool for financing public services is further reduced when we consider
how the U.S. economy has transformed since the 1970s. In neo-liberal fashion, the socalled “free market” (i.e., large corporate interests) has transformed the dominant mode
of production in the name of de-industrialization, de-regulation, and privatization
(Eisenstein 2009). The free movement of capital across the globe has helped spur
globalization, maximize profits for elite interests, and mobilize labor (Golash-Boza and
Parker 2008). How has this affected the U.S.?
Large urban centers, like Chicago, have consequently shifted their manufacturingbased economies to service-oriented ones (Sassen 1990; Wilson 1987). This transition
has left many unemployed or underemployed as work has simply disappeared. The
remaining work available can be characterized by what has been labeled “McJobs”
(Ritzer [1993] 2011). Such jobs typically pay low wages, have few opportunities for
advancement, and employ a readily dispensable or replaceable workforce. Not only are
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people confronted with monetary hardship, but this consequently adds to economic
strains for the government. McJobs do not lend to larger tax bases that governments can
draw from. The pool of potential tax revenue dwindles, yet public services must still be
provided.
The social and economic dimensions of neo-liberalism act as a coupled force
creating a fragile condition for state-financed public services. Anti-tax resentment and
service-oriented economies translate into little money to fund such things as healthcare,
housing, and education. Because states must still provide these public services,
alternative means of generating revenue must be established. State lotteries are among the
few options available as a solution to this problem. And it helps that Americans love to
gamble.
Lotteries, High Stakes Public Financing
Public support remains in high favor of state lotteries, as they are among the most
popular forms of gambling by American adults (Gillespie 1999). In fact, one poll reports
that approximately 46 percent of American adults purchased a lottery ticket within the
past year (Jones 2009). Other figures show annual lottery ticket revenues throughout the
nation’s forty-one state-operated lotteries total more than $40 billion, which averages
$212 per adult residing in a lottery state and $372 per household (Guryan and Kearney
2009).
In Illinois, lottery sales surpassed record-breaking totals for the seventh straight
year during the 2009 fiscal year: approximately $2.1 billion (“Illinois Lottery” 2010). Of
these revenues, 30 percent was allocated to the Common School Fund, which is the
primary source for financing public primary and secondary education in Illinois; the
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remaining money was designated for the lottery’s operating costs, prize winnings, and
other expenses (“State of Illinois” 2010). See Figure 1 for a breakdown of where lotterygenerated revenues were expended, and see Figure 2 for an overview of how much
lottery-generated money has been earmarked for Illinois public education over the past
few years (“Illinois Lottery” 2005, 2009, 2010). For the 2009 fiscal year, 30 percent of
lottery-generated revenues equated to approximately $625 million, which represents more
than 20 percent of the state’s total budget for public education (“State of Illinois” 2009).
In years past, these contributions have varied but remained significant: FY08–$657MM;
FY07–$622MM; FY06–$670MM; FY05–$619MM; FY04–$570MM; FY03–$540MM
(“Illinois Lottery” 2005; 2009). As these figures show, the IL is a money-making
machine when it comes to public education finance.
Figure 1. Expenditures of Lottery-Generated Revenues, FY2009

Source: “Illinois Lottery” 2010
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Historically speaking, the IL is relatively new. It was created in 1973 by Illinois
lawmakers for the purpose of providing supplemental funding for education (Gribben and
Bean 2005). This promise, however, has not been kept. Since its inception, the IL has
done little to supplement or provide additional funds to the state’s public education. In
1985, state policymakers passed additional legislation to guarantee public education
received its earmarked revenues from the lottery (Borg and Mason 1988). Even with the
passage of this additional legislation, the IL has not increased or provided the additional
support as originally promised. Instead, lottery revenues have displaced other sources of
revenue that had previously financed the state’s public education (Borg and Mason
1988).
Figure 2. Lottery Revenues Earmarked for IL Public Education, FY2004-2008

Source: “Illinois Lottery” 2005, 2009
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Today, the state government of Illinois finds itself in a position of economic
dependency. The state is confronted with budgetary shortfalls, the contemporary
economic outlook is uncertain, and no alternatives are readily available for generating
large sums of money. In this context, the state is an “instant winner” when it can reduce
tax increases and rely upon the lottery to consistently provide hundreds of millions of
dollars every year. Without these funds, Illinois public education would likely suffer. For
these reasons, among others, the IL shows no signs of being abandoned or replaced any
time soon.

CHAPTER THREE
THE LOTTERY TAX: GENERATED FROM AND EXPENDED UPON WHOM?
Because lottery-generated revenues are monies collected by the state and then
expended upon a public service, like education, I, like others such as Nibert (2000),
define the lottery as a mechanism of taxation. Unlike other forms of taxation, lotterygenerated revenues depend upon “voluntary” participation. It is not imposed like
property, sales, and income taxes. Rather, it is an “implicit” form of taxation that people
can elect to pay by purchasing lottery tickets (Clotfelter and Cook 1989). The
requirement of voluntary participation does not negate the fact that the lottery is a
mechanism of taxation. Revenues carry the same value regardless of how the state
collects them (Clotfelter and Cook 1989).
But from whom do the lottery-generated revenues primarily come? If
advertisements are any indication, they come from marginalized groups such as the poor
and minority racial groups. Consider one IL billboard advertisement from the mid-1980s.
As reported by Barry Cronin (1986) of the Chicago Sun-Times, it read “How to go from
Washington Boulevard to Easy Street–Play the Illinois State Lottery.” This sign was
located at 2300 W. Washington Blvd., which at the time was a poverty-stricken,
predominately black neighborhood. Though similar advertisements with various local
street names were posted throughout the state, Ronald Koziol and Dave Schneidman
(1986) of the Chicago Tribune reported that these ads were not nearly as effective
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compared to ads located in urban areas where mostly black, socio-economically
disadvantaged people were heavily concentrated. Similar ads were virtually ineffective in
suburban areas where neighborhoods were predominately both white and wealthy.
Another suggesstive IL advertisement includes a campaign that delivers a similar
message. As Robert Goodman details (1995), billboards were selectively placed in lowincome, predominately minority-concentrated areas and tauntingly read, “This could be
your ticket out.” Such ads appeal to elusive dreams of fortune for people located in
marginalized social positions. Consequently, they encourage many to make bad bets in
which the house almost always wins.
Unlike Robin Hood, the lottery swindles money from the poor and gives it back to
the rich. As Mark Thornton (1999) aptly describes, lotteries represent a Sheriff of
Nottingham tax because of their regressive nature. That is, lottery players with fewer
resources of income and wealth spend more money (in real dollar amounts and in
proportions to income and wealth) on lottery tickets compared to their socioeconomically
advantaged counterparts. Numerous studies corroborate this finding (see Blalock, Just,
and Simon 2007; Borg and Mason 1988; Borg, Mason, and Shapiro 1991; Combs, Kim,
and Spry 2008; McCrary and Pavlak 2002; Price and Novak 1999; Stranahan and Borg
1998).
Though most of the literature suggests the lottery is a regressive source of
revenue, this finding has not achieved consensus. Three studies are worth noting. One is
particular to Illinois, the other regards Colorado, and the last one has national relevance.
In Illinois, John Mikesell (1989) found that income has a proportional relationship to
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lottery play throughout all income levels. In other words, the more money a person makes
the more frequently he or she plays the lottery. This counters the numerous findings
referenced above, which virtually conclude that the poor play more. In Colorado, Ann
Hansen (1995) found a positive relationship between a person’s education and lottery
play. Essentially, her data showed that people with higher education attainment purchase
comparably more lottery tickets. Moreover, a national Gallup poll shows further
inconsistencies. As opposed to being a regressive source of revenue, Jack Ludwig (1999)
reports that the lottery may actually be a progressive tax structure. This poll shows that a
larger proportion of people with higher income and education attainment play the lottery
compared to their socioeconomically disadvantaged counterparts. In light of these
inconsistent findings, more empirical investigation is needed to determine whether lottery
represents a socioeconomically regressive source of revenue.
Further inconsistencies remain when race and ethnicity are introduced. Some
studies identify no difference among whites, blacks, or Hispanics in the frequency of
their overall lottery play (McCrary and Pavlak 2002; Stranahan and Borg 1998). These
same studies do show, however, that blacks disproportionately spend more money on
lottery products. Cook and Clotfelter (1993) confirm this trend. Though many studies are
available detailing the lottery play of whites versus blacks, considerably fewer studies
that include Hispanics are available. Notable exceptions include Hansen’s (1995) study of
Colorado lottery play and Price and Novak’s (1999) study of Texas lottery play. In both
these studies, scholars found that Hispanics spend more money on particular lottery
products that cost less and yield smaller rewards like “Instant Win” tickets. Aside from
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whites, blacks, and Hispanics, other racial and ethnic groups are virtually absent from the
literature. Therefore, more empirical analysis is needed to determine not only if the
lottery is a socioeconomically regressive source of revenue, but if, and to what extent, the
lottery is regressive for different racial groups. If it is, then this means that certain groups
absorb the brunt of financing a considerable portion of Illinois public education.
The Lottery Tax, Expended on Whom?
Many critics of the lottery call it exploitative, inequitable, and unjust. While this
position may resonate with many people’s moral reservations about the lottery, such a
conclusion remains premature without empirical substantiation. For this position to be
proven, evidence detailing not only who plays the lottery but who benefits from lotteryfunded services is needed. In economic terms, this analysis is known as the economic
incidence of the lottery, which involves simultaneously measuring how revenues are
generated and expended. To my knowledge, few studies are inclusive of such an analysis.
Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991) corroborate this as they argue that a majority of lottery
studies have “looked at only half the issue–the tax side of incidence” (p. 15). That is,
most studies examine the generation of lottery revenues, but not how these funds are
spent. While this area of research is relatively underdeveloped, it is worthwhile pointing
out the few innovative studies that have taken such an approach.
Case studies measuring the economic incidence of the lottery include the states of
Georgia, Illinois, and Florida. Each of these studies measures the net tax liability for
households residing within the state. In Georgia, McCrary and Pavlak (2002) found
residents earning less spend proportionally more of their incomes on lottery tickets than
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those with higher incomes. Also, they conclude lottery-funded programs such as higher
education HOPE scholarships disproportionately benefit those who would attend college
with or without financial assistance.
In Illinois, Borg and Mason (1988) report similar results. They argue the lottery is
a bad bet for two reasons. Like other studies, they found that lower income households
play the lottery more frequently than their counterparts. But these authors go further to
argue that all Illinois households are shortchanged by the lottery, regardless of income
level. This is because Illinois households contribute more tax revenues through lottery
play than they receive from lottery-earmarked expenditures to public education.
Whereas case studies of Georgia and Illinois yield consistent findings, the case of
Florida paints a somewhat different picture. Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991) found that
most households, regardless of income level, enjoyed a net gain from lottery
expenditures. In other words, most Florida households received more lottery-generated
expenditures on education than they contributed. However, this trend has one exception:
Households earning less than $10,000 annually. Households in this income range spend
more money on the lottery than they receive in expenditures. Therefore, the lottery is a
losing bet for households in the lowest income group. But other households are “instant
winners.”
As these studies indicate, the lottery is like a Sheriff of Nottingham tax. To
varying extents, it takes from the poor and gives to the rich. These studies do an apt job
of showing how capital is transferred away from one or more groups and allocated to
another group or groups. Though these studies are highly suggestive, more
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comprehensive evidence is needed to conclude whether the lottery is exploitative,
inequitable, and unjust. Despite their innovative efforts, these pioneering studies (and
lottery studies in general) remain limited in a number of ways. And it is this subject to
which I now turn my attention.

CHAPTER FOUR
LOTTERY STUDIES: A BRIEF CRITIQUE
Lottery studies are limited by substantive shortcomings. As Roberto Garvía
(2007) notes, the literature remains largely absent of a sociological perspective. Instead,
much has been written by those in the fields of economics, political science, public
policy, and business administration. Moreover, lottery studies lack a race perspective.
Either lottery scholars dismiss race from their analysis or they narrowly address race by
acknowledging it as a peripheral, not central, subject. 1 When this happens, lottery
scholars underscore the continuing significance of race and how lotteries (re)produce
racial inequality. In terms of the IL and ISBE, racial inequality is (re)produced when the
state generates revenues from some groups and allocates them to others.
Not only have researchers underscored the significance of race as it relates to the
regressive nature of lotteries, but researchers that do address race have traditionally done
so in dichotomous fashion. Instead of recognizing multiple groups, most studies rely on
binary analyses addressing only two groups. Such an approach overlooks many racial
groups, and thus is over-simplistic. For instance, Borg and Mason (1988) and Borg,
Mason, and Shapiro (1991) analyze race as if this category is comprised of two groups:

1

Many researchers overemphasize socioeconomic indicators of class, while they treat
race as an “afterthought” variable (see Blalock, Just, and Simon 2007; Borg, Mason, and
Shapiro 1991). Still, others omit race from their analysis altogether (see Combs, Kim, and
Spry 2008).
16
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whites and nonwhites. A similar problem confronts McCrary and Pavlak (2002) because
they analyze race as if it is comprised of blacks and nonblacks. As these strategies show,
racial groups are collapsed in dichotomous fashion into umbrella racial categories. This is
problematic because, as Bonilla-Silva and Embrick (2006) contend, the growing presence
of other groups aside from whites and blacks nuances racial stratification in the U.S. The
increased representation of groups such as Hispanics, Asians, multiracials, among others
redraws the color line, and it complicates how political, cultural, and social power is
distributed. Therefore, when researchers follow a dichotomous analysis of race, they not
only exclude significant populations of racial others but they oversimplify racial
inequality in the U.S.
While lottery studies have substantive shortcomings in terms of race, many are
also limited by inherent methodological problems. A number of methods undertaken by
lottery scholars undermine the findings their studies have produced and what conclusions
they have drawn. Briefly, I address some of these problems and follow-up by suggesting
alternative methodological approaches.
To begin, many lottery studies rely on two modes of data collection: mail surveys
(see Borg, Mason, and Shapiro 1991) and telephone interviews (see Borg and Mason
1988; McCrary and Pavlak 2002; Stranahan and Borg 1998). Each approach poses unique
concerns. When data is collected via mail or telephone surveys, several assumptions are
made about the studied population. Those who utilize mail surveys assume potential
research participants reside in a permanent dwelling, while those who utilize telephone
interviews assume potential participants not only have a permanent dwelling but a
landline telephone located within that dwelling. Given the regressive nature of lotteries,
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these assumptions can significantly impair a study’s ability to tap the appropriate
population and generalize beyond the sampled population.
Such shortcomings are apparent in studies performed by McCrary and Pavlek
(2002) and Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991). In the former, data was collected via the
telephone interview. Not only did this approach gain a 51.3 percent response rate, but
only 51 percent of participants were active lottery players. That is, only half of half the
sampled population played the lottery. Furthermore, this sample was oversaturated by
whites, females, and homeowners, which the authors found to be the groups least likely
to play the lottery. Similar problems confront Borg, Mason, and Shapiro’s (1991) study,
which utilizes mail surveys. Such an approach is notorious for its low response rates,
which are typically ranked at the bottom of all modes of data collection (Czaja and Blair
2005). This trend holds true for Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991) as they reported a
dismal response rate of 17.8 percent. When response rates are so low, the quality of the
survey and study design come into question.
Simply said, much work remains in the area of lottery studies. Though the critique
I have offered is not exhaustive, it does outline some of the substantive and
methodological limitations within the current body of lottery studies. Bearing these
shortcomings in mind, new research designs should practice ingenuity and innovation to
avoid problems of the past and progress what knowledge lottery studies have to offer. For
my study design, I attempt to do just that.

CHAPTER FIVE
A CHICAGO CASE STUDY: PURPOSE AND METHODS
Because my analytic goals are twofold, the methodological design is organized in
phases. My research agenda is to venture where few, if any, lottery and race scholars
have gone: Analyze the racialized economic incidence of the lottery. This entails
simultaneously examining the generation and appropriation of lottery revenues, with
respect to the racial makeup of the communities involved in this money-exchange
process. By assessing the generation of lottery revenues, I attempt to determine to what
extent these funds are racially regressive. In the second phase of analysis, I critically
examine how lottery-generated funds are distributed to Illinois public education.
Sampling Frame
To measure the economic incidence of the lottery, I rely upon spatial analysis of
zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs). Within the city of Chicago, there are, according to the
2000 Census, 55 ZCTAs. However, not all these areas are included in my analysis. I
employed a sampling scheme that considers the racial composition of the population age
18 years and older for each ZCTA, and if a ZCTA meets a certain racial makeup then it is
included in my analysis.
Drawing from the work of Krysan and Brader (2009), I created a taxonomy (see
Table 1) to determine which ZCTAs were sampled. In it, I focus on four groups: whites,
blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. Because other groups lack a statistically significant
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portion of the population, as recorded by census data, they are excluded from focus. (See
Table 2 for a list of the sampled ZCTAs and their associated Community Areas; see
APPENDIX A for supplementary demographic data profiling these ZCTAs.)
Table 1. Typology of Chicago ZCTAs by Racial/Ethnic Composition*
All white

communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are white only

Mostly white

communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are white only and there
are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race

All Asian

communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are Asian only

Mostly Asian

communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are Asian only and there
are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race

All Hispanic

communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are Hispanic only

Mostly Hispanic communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are Hispanic only and
there are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race
All black

communities where 85 percent or more of residents or students are black only

Mostly black

communities where 70 percent or more of residents or students are black only and there
are fewer than 15 percent of any single other race

* Population that is 18 years and older.

For my purposes, a ZCTA-based analysis is sufficed because of Chicago’s high
levels of segregation. This city remains among the most racially segregated cities in the
United States (Lewis Mumford Center 2001). Therefore, a ZCTA-to-ZCTA comparison
is also inherently a comparison of racial groups and their residential communities.
According to Massey and Denton (1993), housing segregation, which generally refers to
the tendency for racial groups to live apart, can be distinguished as having five distinct
dimensions according to geography: unevenness, spatial isolation, clustering,
centralization, and concentration. If four out of five of these dimensions characterize a
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geographic area then hypersegregation, or segregation at much exaggerated levels, is
present. Chicago is characterized by such a label (Massey and Denton 1993). 1
Segregation in housing corresponds with segregation in education because, as
McKoy and Vincent (2006) point out, these two “have always been organically
connected” (p. 143). Public school enrollment is generally organized by the geographic
proximity of residence to school location (McKoy and Vincent 2006; Orfield and Lee
2005). Public education in Chicago follows this trend. Because race is a salient
determinant of where someone lives within Chicago, school enrollments are racially
divided across schools (Sohoni and Saporito 2009). The racial isolation of blacks and
Hispanics in public schools is further exacerbated considering that whites are much more
likely to attend private schools (Sohoni and Saporito 2009). In short, Chicago’s high level

1

A brief comment on the housing debate between race and class is warranted here. Some
sociologists attribute the persistence of segregation within Chicago as resulting from
economic, not racial, forces (e.g. Wilson 1978; 1987). However, Massey and Denton
(1993) show how racial minorities, particularly blacks and some Puerto Ricans, are
relegated to live alongside other minorities, regardless of class measures such as
household income level.
My stance differs from both these positions: It is not the salience of class over race, or
vice versa, that maintains segregation. Instead, it is the convergent and interlocking
nature of race and class that maintains segregation. To illustrate my point, consider
Oliver and Shaprio’s ([1995] 2006) Black Wealth/ White Wealth. Limiting their analysis
to the black-white racial dichotomy, these authors show how blacks are cumulatively
disadvantaged in the housing market, while whites are cumulatively advantaged. Blacks
are more likely to be discriminated against in supposedly open housing markets, steered
to poverty-stricken, heavily black-concentrated neighborhoods, denied loans despite
possessing comparably equivalent measures of credit-worthiness, charged much higher
interest rates once those loans are approved, reside in homes that appreciate value at
significantly lower rates than their white counterparts, and transfer significantly lower
values of accumulated wealth to succeeding generations.
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of segregation in both housing and education enables a ZCTA-based sampling frame to
be adequate for my analytic purposes.
Table 2. Selected Chicago ZCTAs and their Associated Community Areas*
All White
60614
60631
60646
60655
60656
Mostly White
60601
60611
60613
60630
60634
60638
60657
All Black
60619
60620
60621
60624
60628
60636
60644
60649
60653
Mostly Black
60637
60643
60651
Mostly Hispanic
60632

Lincoln Park, Logan Square
Edison Park, Norwood Park
Forest Glen, Jefferson Park, North Park, Norwood Park
Beverly, Morgan Park, Mount Greenwood
O’Hare
The Loop
Near North Side
Lakeview, North Center, Uptown
Albany Park, Forest Glen, Irving Park, Jefferson Park, Portage Park
Belmont Cragin, Dunning, Monteclare, Portage Park
Clearing, Garfield Ridge
Lakeview, North Center
Avalon Park, Burnside, Calumet Heights, Chatham, Greater Grand Crossing,
Roseland, South Shore
Auburn Gresham, Beverly, Chatham, Greater Grand Crossing, Roseland,
Washington Heights
Englewood, Greater Grand Crossing, Washington Park
East Garfield Park, Humboldt Park, North Lawndale, West Garfield Park
Pullman, Roseland, Washington Heights, West Pullman
Chicago Lawn, Gage Park, West Englewood
Austin
South Shore
Douglas, Grand Boulevard, Kenwood, Oakland
Greater Grand Crossing, Hyde Park, South Shore, Washington Park, Woodlawn
Beverly, Morgan Park, Washington Heights, West Pullman
Austin, Humboldt Park
Archer Heights, Brighten Park, Gage Park, Garfield Ridge, West Elsdon

Source: “Chicago Tribune” 2011
* ZCTA 60654 has a total of 7 listed residents. Because this population is statistically insignificant, it is
omitted from analysis.

In total, 26 ZTCAs meet the outlined criteria set forth in the typology. One of
these (60654) is removed from analysis, however, because it is statistically significant; it
has only seven residents. Of the remaining 25 ZCTAs, five are “all white,” seven are
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“mostly white,” nine are “all black,” three are “mostly black,” and one is “mostly
Hispanic.” A majority of the white ZCTAs fall on the north and northwest sides of the
city, while a majority of the black ZCTAs fall in Chicago’s traditional “black belt” areas:
the west and south sides. Only one mostly Hispanic ZCTA was selected, and it is located
on the southwest side. 2 (For a map of the ZCTAs included in my analysis, see Figure 3.)
Mode of Data Collection
The analytic logic driving this study is to “follow the money.” In other words, I
detail where lottery revenues originate and how they are then distributed. To accomplish
this task, I collect data from various sources, including census data and other public
records. The 2000 Census is tapped as the source for demographic data of residents per
each ZCTA. Data concerning the generation of lottery revenues was collected via

2

The fact that only one Hispanic community was selected can be explained, in part, by
newly emerging census trends. The number of Hispanics who solely identify (ethnically
and racially) as such is dwindling. In fact, nearly half of Hispanics racially identified as
white during the 2000 Census (Michael and Timberlake 2008). Some have attributed this
trend to the notion that Hispanics are experiencing a “whitening effect,” in which they are
increasingly self-selecting as white, marrying and reproducing with whites, residing
alongside whites in residential neighborhoods, and achieving socioeconomic mobility
that is more comparable to whites than blacks (Gallagher 2004; Yancey 2003). A
significant number of Hispanics, however, reject identifying with a racial category
altogether by opting for “some other race” or skipping the question. This can be
explained by the fact that many Hispanics, especially Mexicans and Puerto Ricans,
answer survey questions regarding race and ethnicity as mere substitutes for one another,
rather than distinctly different (Perez 2008). Logan (2004) has labeled this particular
group the “Hispanic Hispanics.” They tend to be darker-skinned and have lower
socioeconomic attainment levels compared to whites and other lighter-skinned Hispanics
(Bonilla-Silva and Embrick 2006; Michael and Timberlake 2008). The ZCTA included in
my sample meets such criteria.
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institutional audit of the IL, while data concerning the distribution of lottery revenues was
collected via institutional audit of the ISBE.
Figure 3. Map of Selected Chicago ZCTAs, 2000
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All demographic data collected from the 2000 Census is readily available online.3
This census data represents the most comprehensive dataset that details the demographics
of residents living within each Chicago ZCTA. (For a brief methodological critique of the
U.S. Census, see APPENDIX B.) Though census data can be collected with relative ease,
information regarding the generation and distribution of lottery revenues entailed more
difficulty.
Financial records detailing the amounts of lottery-generated revenue per ZCTA
were obtained after performing an institutional audit of the IL (see APPENDIX C for the
formal request). This audit was performed in accordance of Illinois Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), or 5 ILCS 140, guidelines (see Madigan 2004). 4 Because
lottery-generated revenues are partially used to finance a public service provided by the
state, financial documents that detail them constitute public records of interest. According
to FOIA, this makes them available to the public upon request.
In addition to requesting financial records of lottery-generated revenues, I also
collected documentation of how public education is funded in Illinois. Like census data,
this information is publicly available online. 5 The process by which the state funds public
education is made explicit in Public Act 90-548, which outlines the General State Aid
3

This dataset can be accessed online. Decennial census data for the 2000 Census is
available at http://factfinder.census.gov/. All census data utilized for this study came from
Summary Files 1 and 3 (“U.S. Census Bureau” 2001a, 2001b).
4

Financial records were requested in electronic format, rather than in physical document
form.

5

This data was accessed at ISBE’s website: http://www.isbe.state.il.us/funding/pdf/
gsa_overview.pdf.
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(GSA) formula used by the ISBE to distribute funds across the state. I have purposefully
chosen to analyze this law rather than show where lottery-generated funds are expended.
This is because “tracking” the money is virtually impossible given how state government
has organized its finance structure scheme for public education. 6

6

Bluntly put, the finance process of Illinois public education is similar to a money
laundering scheme. This is because the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR) disguises
the origins of earmarked revenues for education through its overly-simplistic accounting
practices. First, IDOR generates money for education from numerous sources, including
the private sector as well as the state and federal government, and then it transfers this
money into one general education fund–the Common School Fund (Johnson 1999; “State
of Illinois” 2009). Once money is located here, the ISBE redistributes it to finance public
education (“State of Illinois” 2009). This finance scheme is obscured when the state
lumps several sources of money into one pool, distributes this pool across several
locations, and then fails to keep a ledger to show where money is spent with respect to
where it originated. Because of this laundering-like finance scheme, it is virtually
impossible to track where lottery-generated revenues are spent.

CHAPTER SIX
THE RACIALIZED ECONOMIC INCIDENCE OF THE ILLINOIS LOTTERY
My analytic goals are to measure the racial regressivity of lottery-generated
revenues in Chicago and evaluate how these funds are then distributed. My first goal is
accomplished by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis, while my
second goal is met by critically examining the formula by which state funds are
appropriated. When these analyses are combined, they complement one another to
“follow the money” and show where lottery revenues originate and how they are
expended. Therefore, the completion of these tasks lends a better understanding of the IL
in Chicago and its racialized economic incidence.
Generation of Lottery Revenues
To evaluate social factors associated with lottery-generated revenues, I utilized
OLS regression. This analytic method permits me to gain a more nuanced understanding
of how multiple variables simultaneously, but independently affect the outcome of lottery
sales. In total, I provide four models of regression analysis. In each model the
independent variables remain constant, but the outcome variable changes according to
annual lottery sales. Fiscal years 1999 through 2002 are included. What these multiple
models yield is a more detailed analysis, one that allows trends of annual lottery sales of
ZCTAs to be compared over time. Such an approach lends to a more conclusive study
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since many, rather than one, “snapshots” are considered. 1
Because my unit of analysis is the ZCTA, I rely upon group summary statistics
for independent (and dependent) variables. Situating my research within the literature, I
am primarily interested in how race affects lottery sales. However, I also give
considerable attention to class. Three independent variables are of interest to my analysis,
two that are indicative of class and one of race. In terms of class, I measure education
attainment per ZCTA by considering the percentage of the community that has obtained a
bachelor’s degree or higher, while I measure income by considering the mean household
income per ZCTA. In terms of race, I measure the racial/ethnic composition of each
ZCTA according to the typology (Table 1) mentioned above. This permits me to compare
communities that are predominantly comprised by one group to communities
predominantly comprised by another group. All the while, I control for population size of
those 18 years and older living within each ZCTA. This variable is included as a control
for two reasons. One, I am only interested in those 18 and older because this population
represents the potential tax base for lottery sales given that minors are legally prohibited
from playing. And two, ZCTAs with much larger populations are likely to purchase more
lottery tickets due to the sheer fact that they have a larger pool of potential players. For
results of this analysis, see Table 3.

1

These years have been purposefully selected to compare two sources of data that were
collected at different points in time. U.S. Census data are collected decennially, while
lottery revenues are recorded annually. By comparing census data from 2000 to annual
lottery revenues from fiscal years 1999 through 2002, my analysis yields more precision
by cross-examining data collected at similar points in time.
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Table 3. OLS Regression Models of Lottery Sales per ZCTA

Independent Variables
Education
Population with a
BS, BA, or Higher,
per ZCTA (in percents)
Income
Mean Household
Income, per ZCTA
(in dollars)
Race/Ethnicity
Racial/Ethnic
Composition,
per ZCTA
(5-Point Scale)*
Control Variable
Tax Base Population
Population Aged
18 and Older, per
ZCTA (in percents)
Constant
Pearson’s R
R2
Std Error of the Estimate
N (ZCTAs)

FY 1999

FY 2000

FY 2001

FY 2002

-195,350
(58,198)

-193,243
(59,279)

-184,213
(58,764)

-189,289
(63,518)

192
(69)

193
(70)

187
(69)

189
(78)

2,228,913
(517,712)

2,329,109
(527,323)

2,317,587
(522,748)

2,273,998
(565,033)

194
(37)

184
(38)

179
(37)

189
(40)

-10,683,770
.892
.796
2,773,779
25

-10,756,959
.888
.788
2,825,274
25

-10,745,463 -10,504,884
.885
.873
.784
.762
2,800,763
3,027,314
25
25

Note: Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (B) with their standard errors listed below in
parentheses.
* The 5-Point Nominal Scale is measured according to the typology outlined in Table One. Its values are as follows: 1
– All White; 2 – Mostly White; 3 – Mostly Hispanic; 4 – Mostly Black; 5 – All Black.

Table 3 presents much information, but what does it all mean? First, I begin by
explaining the analytic purpose of each piece of statistical information provided, then my
discussion transitions into what this information collectively means. The main entries
listed include unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors of the regression
coefficients. An unstandardized coefficient represents the predicted change in the
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dependent variable associated with a one-unit change in a particular independent variable,
when all other independent variables are held constant (Lewis-Beck 1980). Simply put,
this coefficient is the slope of a regression line. Consider an example from the first model
(FY 1999). When a ZCTA’s racial/ethnic composition shifts from all white to mostly
white, mostly white to mostly Hispanic, mostly Hispanic to mostly black, or mostly black
to all black, annual lottery sales per ZCTA increase by $2,228,913, when measures of
income and education are controlled. Therefore, an all black ZCTA contributes
$11,144,565 more annual lottery revenues than an all white ZCTA when income and
education are held constant. Trends of the unstandardized regression coefficients for
Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA remained consistent across all four models.
“Blacker” communities contribute the most money to the lottery tax, while “whiter”
communities contribute least. Hispanic communities fall in-between these groups,
contributing more than “whiter” communities but less than “blacker” communities. (See
Figure 4 for an overview of these trends.)
It should be noted that the unstandardized coefficients of the models should be
interpreted with caution. Because multicollinearity exists among the independent
variables, particularly between the measures for education and income, these coefficients
are vulnerable to estimation error. “The multicollinearity problem” simply refers to when
independent variables within a model are highly correlated; its presence causes standard
errors for each independent variable’s unstandardized coefficient to range broadly
(Lewis-Beck 1980). The presence of multicollinearity, however, does not fully dismiss
my findings altogether. I remain confident that the lottery remains a racially regressive
source of revenue given the supplemental tests I have performed measuring the degree of
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existing multicollinearity (see APPENDIX D). Furthermore, reliability of the models
remains intact, as overall predictability of the outcomes is not affected (Lewis-Beck
1980).
Figure 4. Unstandardized Coefficients for Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA

Note: An unstandardized regression coefficient represents the predicted change in the dependent variable associated
with a one-unit change in a particular independent variable, when all other independent variables are held constant.
Simply put, this coefficient is the slope of a regression line. The above graph illustrates the shift in annual lottery sales
per ZCTA when a ZCTA’s racial/ethnic composition shifts one-unit (e.g., mostly black to all black), when measures of
income and education are controlled. The “Mostly Hispanic” ZCTA represents the baseline comparison.

The second main entry includes the standard error of the unstandardized
regression coefficient, which simply refers to the average estimated error. Using the same
example from the FY 1999 model, I estimate that the standard error of the unstandardized
regression coefficient is $517,712. This means that for each one-unit shift in racial/ethnic
composition per ZCTA the change in annual lottery sales per ZCTA ranges from
1,711,201 to 2,746,625, when the other independent variables are held constant.
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Below the main entries are various other statistics that lend a more comprehensive
analysis. The first is the constant, which value represents the y-intercept. Its function is to
account for what is not accounted for by the independent variables (Lewis-Beck 1980).
That is, its value makes up the difference on the dependent variable for what remains
uncalculated by the independent variables.
The next statistic provided is Pearson’s R, which is short for Pearson’s
correlations coefficient. This statistic is commonly used to describe how well the model
“fits” the data. (Norušis 2008). It ranges from -1 to +1, and this scale measures how close
cases cluster to the regression line. If the value is +1 then all the cases fall along the
positive regression line, and if the value is -1 then all the cases fall along the negative
regression line. Because the Pearson’s R statistic approximates .9 in all four models
above, this indicates that strong, positive linear relationships exist between the
independent and dependent variables.
Listed below Pearson’s R is R2, which refers to “explained variance.” Essentially,
this statistic is a comparison of the actual observations versus predicted observations. It
“tells you what proportion of the variability of the dependent variable is ‘explained’ by
the regression model” (Norušis 2008). For the various models above, the R2 statistic
approaches .80. This means that the models consistently explain nearly 80 percent of the
variability for annual lottery revenues.
The standard error of the estimate refers to the prediction error of the dependent
variable. This statistic is calculated by comparing the standard deviation of the observed
outcome with the predicted outcome (Lewis-Beck 1980). This value enables researchers
to construct confidence intervals, which is essentially a range of where some predicted
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outcome falls. It is a probability-driven estimate. For the models above, the standard error
of the estimate ranges between $2.7 and $3.0 million.
All these statistics taken together, regression analysis yields several results that
are of interest to me. It enables me to measure the effects of independent variables,
disassociated from other independent variables, on some dependent variable. In theory,
regression analysis allows researchers to disentangle and measure “race effects” from
“class effects” (Bonilla-Silva and Baiocchi 2008; Oliver and Shapiro [1995] 2006). It
also lends a means of analysis that can assess how race operates simultaneously alongside
other variables, since it rarely exists in a vacuum disconnected from other factors such as
class (Bonilla-Silva 2001). Through the equation that expresses OLS regression analysis,
I can perform these analytic tasks. This equation is diagramed below (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. OLS Regression Equation for Models of Lottery Sales per ZCTA

The formula of OLS regression analysis is a linear estimation that models the
relationship between some dependent variable and various independent variables.
Pertaining to my analysis, it estimates how race, education, and income affect annual
lottery sales, per ZCTA. Whereas the unstandardized regression coefficients are like
small pieces of a puzzle, the OLS linear equation represents the larger puzzle. In other
words, it forecasts the level of annual lottery sales given particular values of the
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independent variables. To better illustrate the relationship of race, income and education
on annual lottery sales, I provide a number of graphs below (See Figures 6 through 9).
For simplicity sake, however, I have omitted the standard error of the estimate from
calculation. This means the outputs provided in the graphs are crude measures. These
graphs nonetheless show linear predictions of annual lottery sales utilizing the formula
outlined above.
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Substantively, what do these graphs illustrate? It paints a consistent picture of
how race “colors” annual lottery revenues. Annual lottery revenues per ZCTA increase
accordingly by racial/ethnic composition at every income and education level. White
ZCTAs spend less than Hispanic ZCTAs, and Hispanic ZCTAs spend less than black
ZCTAs. This means that communities predominantly comprised by people of color pay
significantly higher lottery taxes than do communities predominantly comprised by
whites. Altogether, these graphs illustrate the racial/ethnic regressivity of the lottery
irrespective of class status.
Appropriation of Lottery-Generated Revenues
The second phase of analysis involves an examination of how the ISBE finances
public education. To do this, I evaluate the criteria outlined by the GSA formula. Based
on previous research (see McKoy and Vincent 2006), education financing throughout
much of the country is determined primarily by three factors: district property taxes,
student enrollment, and average daily attendance (ADA). The state of Illinois is not much
different.
According to the GSA formula (see “ISBE” 2011), three criteria are considered in
appropriating state funds to school districts, with some exceptions. (For a breakdown of
how the ISBE generally finances public education, see Figure 10). The first criterion
dictates that per pupil funding per district is based upon measures of local wealth. Such
wealth primarily consists of revenue generated by property taxes, which is also known as
Equalized Assessed Value (EAV) in Illinois. Depending upon levels of wealth, each
district is appropriated a foundational level of funds per pupil. Impoverished districts are
distributed more money than the wealthiest districts, which receive a flat rate. The second
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criterion accounts for ADA. School districts with high attendance rates receive more
money, while those with lower rates receive less money. The wealthiest school districts,
however, receive a flat rate per pupil. The third criterion considers an additional
provision for districts confronted with significant poverty. Districts with high poverty
counts can receive additional state funding, but the amount of funding is determined by
two factors: the district’s number of low-income residents and the average daily
attendance of the district’s pupils.
Figure 10. GSA Formula: How the ISBE Finances Public Education

Source: “ISBE” 2011

At face value, it seems as though the GSA formula embodies education finance
policy that is both race-neutral and economically progressive. Each district’s financial
ability without regard to race is considered before any state aid is appropriated. The three
criteria outlined above show the state’s attempt to ensure districts that lack resources, as
determined by the property tax base, have a foundational level of funding, while more
affluent areas are obligated to fund their own district’s education. For those that do not
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have ample means, the state intervenes to make up the difference and guarantee that each
district has a minimum level of funding. As stated on the Illinois State Comptroller’s
(N.d.) website, “The formula is designed to distribute more aid to poorer districts and a
minimum amount to wealthier districts” (Para. 1).
Intentions, however, are different from outcomes. Though Illinois education
policy is intended to be race-neutral and economically progressive, its consequences can
often be quite the opposite. Because the formula guarantees only a minimum level of
funding, significant inequities remain due to disparate wealth gaps, which are inherently
racialized, across districts. Critics argue that the formula relies too much on local
property taxes (see “Center of Tax and Accountability” 2008). Wealthier districts, which
tend to be white, can often pour more money into education than poorer districts, even
when they receive substantially less state aid. This is among the points made in a recent
lawsuit against the state spearheaded by the Chicago Urban League (2008). This
organization has challenged Illinois’ financing mechanism as one that inherently ensures
second-class education for some and first-class education for others.
Progressive intentions of the GSA formula are further displaced when lotterygenerated revenues (and from whom they originate) are considered. Although such
money constitutes a tax that finances a public service, it is not a criterion considered in
the GSA formula. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Lottery revenues are not
generated equally across Chicago, let alone the state of Illinois. As the regression models
above show, the lottery is a regressive source of state income in terms of race.
Communities predominately comprised by people of color contribute considerably more
money to education via the lottery than do communities predominately comprised by
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whites. Because the lottery is a racially regressive source of education finance, it offsets
the distribution formula that is supposedly race-neutral. Racially marginalized
communities are the primary source for lottery-generated revenues, so a considerable
amount of money available to finance state education comes from these very same
communities. Therefore, the formula ends up circulating capital out of areas
predominantly comprised by people of color and spreading it across all areas.
In a worst case scenario, racially marginalized communities end up subsidizing
public education, a service that the entire state population is entitled. The GSA formula
permits such an occurrence when it does not consider lottery-generated revenues (and
from where they come) as a criterion for funding each district. Communities of color
could collectively contribute more capital to education through the lottery (in addition to
other sources of earmarked revenues for education) than predominantly white
communities. When this occurs, financing public education becomes even more of a
racially inequitable obligation. And these consequences can manifest themselves even
despite intentions that are seemingly race-neutral and progressive.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THE LOTTERY: STATE-SPONSORED RACISM?
Malcolm X would often tell his followers, “Racism is like a Cadillac, they bring
out a new model every year” (cited in Lipsitz 1998:182). Although new models look
much different than models of old, the fact of the matter is a Cadillac is still a Cadillac.
Likewise, racism is still racism, regardless of how it has changed throughout the years. At
its core, racism is about how racial categories become a central organizing principle of
social circumstances and opportunities (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 2006; Omi and
Winant 1994). Racial groups atop the hierarchy are enumerated many rewards, both
symbolic and material, while other groups social liabilities based on their race.
Throughout most of U.S. history (since European establishment), formal white
supremacy has been endorsed by the state and many of its citizens to enforce an unequal
distribution of resources (Bonilla-Silva 2001; Feagin 2006). In the modern era, the racial
rule persists in ways that are institutional, covert, and seemingly colorblind, but no less
effective (Bonilla-Silva 2001). The state-sponsored money-exchange process between the
IL and ISBE is a particular example of this new racism because of its deeply racialized
effects, and it is an area of study that remains virtually untouched by critical race
scholars.
As I have shown, the money-exchange process between the IL and ISBE
exemplifies the racialization of state policy and a new model of racism. Finance policy of
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Illinois public education generates and distributes lottery revenues in a way that preserves
undeserved enrichment and unjust impoverishment along racial lines. 1 Lottery-generated
revenues are regressively generated in racial terms, so some communities of color
contribute more money to education via the lottery than others. They are then distributed
without considering from whom they originated through education finance. Such a
process counters policy that is intentionally race-neutral and economically progressive.
This is because lottery-generated revenues earmarked for education are circulated from
communities of color and spread across all communities. Under the worst circumstances,
communities of color are burdened with subsidizing public education. This is especially
true when the amount of their lottery tax contributions eclipse other sources of public
education finance. When lottery-generated revenues are distributed in such a way,
racially inequitable distributions of economic capital are preserved. One community’s
enrichment comes at the expense of another’s impoverishment. It represents a statesponsored money exchange process that captures one mechanism for reproducing racial
inequality. Therefore, let us call this new Cadillac for what it is: Racism.

1

See Chapter One of Feagin’s (2000) Racist America for a thorough discussion of the
concepts: unjust impoverishment and undeserved enrichment. Here, he further explains
the concepts as they relate to a comprehensive perspective of systemic racism and the
social reproduction of racial inequality, particularly white privilege and black burden.

APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL CENSUS INFORMATION
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APPENDIX B
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While census data represents the most comprehensive dataset of demographic
data for the Chicago area and is suitable for my analytic purposes, I do not fully endorse
its method and data because of several unique problems it poses to this study. Here, I
briefly highlight and critique some of these problems. Areas to be addressed include the
timeliness of census data and issues concerning both internal and external validity.
With regard to timeliness, U.S. Census data are collected decennially. Though
these data yield ten-year cross-sections description of the population, they do not detail
the dynamic shifts between these benchmarks. In terms of this study, this poses a
problem. The absence of annual census data dilutes the precision of my analysis. Because
census data are collected decennially but lottery sales annually, my analysis crossexamines decennial data with annual data. To minimize this dilution, I cross-examine
only four cross-sections of annual lottery sales with decennial census data. That is, annual
lottery revenues data from fiscal years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 are be analyzed with
respect to decennial census data from 2000. Such a cross-examination better compares
data collected from similar points in time.
A concern regarding internal validity of census data regards the issue of defining
racial group membership. Internal validity, as Creswell (2009) writes, refers to “the
researcher’s ability to draw correct inferences from the data about the population” (p.
162). Because race is a social construct, a correct way of defining race does not exist.
Thus, James (2008) rightfully points out that the internal validity of census data comes
into question because race and group membership are defined in a static manner (James
2008). On the contrary, Omi and Winant (1994) show that racial boundaries are under
constant (re)negotiation and the process of determining who belongs to what racial
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category depends upon political context. Contrary to the notion that race is a variable, and
therefore a fixed characteristic, Lewis (2003; 2004) further points out that race is a
process and something people “do.” It can be understood as a process entailing
consequences, both material and symbolic, determined by contextual specificity. Lewis
(2003) clarifies:
Race is about who we are, what we do, how we interact. It shapes where
we live, whom we interact with, how we understand ourselves and others.
But it does so in specific ways based on our social and historical location
(p. 7).
In micro-level exchanges, race is an identity that people impose and confer upon one
another. As Lewis (2004) writes, “[Race] is something learned and achieved in
interactions and institutions. It is something we live and perform” (p. 629). Therefore,
group membership is too complex for race and group membership to be exhaustively
operationalized as a variable with fixed characteristics. However, quantitative analyses all
too often commit such errors (James 2008). Consequently, such studies oversimplify a
fluidly complex concept and therefore negatively impacts what inferences can be made
about a studied population. Unfortunately, this study is no different than many other
quantitative studies in that it oversimplifies racial group membership. This is because I
utilize the U.S. Census as a primary source of data.
While limitations of internal validity are inherent within this study’s design,
problems with external validity also apply. External validity refers to the researcher’s
ability to draw inferences from sample data to represent the population of interest
(Creswell 2009). Census data, unfortunately, are vulnerable to threats of external validity
due to sample selection bias. Model (2009) clarifies:
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The greatest source of inaccuracy in censuses is that individuals absent
from the data differ in some systematic way from individuals present. The
converse also occurs: censuses include persons who should be excluded,
but that problem is less severe (p. 166).
Some groups may be overrepresented among the data, and others may be
underrepresented. At worst, census data reflects an untruthful reflection of the population.
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Illinois Lottery
100 W. Randolph, Suite 7-274
Chicago, IL 60601
Re: Illinois Freedom of Information Request
Dear FOIA Officer,
This is a request for information under the Illinois Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS
140. I request that a copy of the following documents be provided to me:
Annual Revenues Generated by Lottery Products per each Chicago Zip
Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA) by fiscal year, from 1999-2000 to 20012002.
The ZCTAs of interest include:
60614
60631
60646
60655
60656
60601
60611
60613
60630
60634
60638
60657
60619
60620
60621
60624
60628
60636
60644
60649
60653
60654
60637
60643
60651
60632
I would like to obtain these records in either electronic format or physical document
form.
I understand that the Act permits a public body to charge a reasonable copying fee not to
exceed the actual cost of reproduction and not including the costs of any search or review
of the records, as stated in 5 ILCS 140(6). I request a waiver of all fees for this request.
Disclosure of the requested information to me is in the public interest because it is likely
to significantly contribute to public understanding of the operations regarding public
education finance in Illinois.
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I am interested in measuring lottery sales as tax-generated revenues, and I want to learn
of where across Chicago these revenues originate. Such a request does not concern
commercial interest. Rather, the inquired information will be utilized in the fulfillment of
a master’s thesis project for the Department of Sociology at Loyola University Chicago.
I look forward to hearing from you in writing within seven working days, as required by
the Act–5 ILCS 140(3).
Sincerely,

Kasey Henricks
Loyola University Chicago
Department of Sociology
1032 W. Sheridan Road
Coffey Hall 434
Chicago, IL 60660
Tele: 423.364.9251
Email: khenricks@luc.edu

APPENDIX D
THE MULTICOLLINEARITY PROBLEM
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For best predictive results, assumptions of OLS regression analysis cannot be
violated. Among these assumptions is “the multicollinearity problem.” This occurs when
independent variables are highly correlated. When multicollienarity is present the overall
reliability of the model remains intact, but coefficient estimates for each independent
variable are susceptible to error (Lewis-Beck 1980). A consequence of multicollinearity
is that standard errors for each independent variable will range broadly.
Lewis-Beck (1980) offers two ways of testing whether multicollinearity exists
within an OLS regression model. One commonly accepted method is two perform
bivariate correlations between all pairs of independent variables within a model. If any
correlation coefficient measures .8 or higher in absolute terms, then multicollinearity
exists. While this method aptly detects correlations between variables, a major limitation
of this diagnostic is that it is limited to examining only two variables at a time. This
technique alone is inadequate for detecting multicollinearity within a multivariate
regression model. To overcome this shortcoming, an additional test is recommended:
“Regress each independent variable on all the other independent variables” (Lewis-Beck
1980:60). When the explained variance (or R2) approaches 100 percent, multicollinearity
is highly evident.
After performing the first test, it becomes evident that multicollinearity may exist.
(See Figure 11 for a summary of these results.) Using a correlation coefficient of .8 (in
absolute terms) as the threshold measure, one pair of independent variables is suspect.
This pair includes mean household income per ZCTA and education attainment level per
ZCTA. Its coefficient measures .905. This correlate indicates that multicollinearity may
exist within my models, but more conclusive evidence is needed for substantiation.
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Figure 11. Multicollinearity Test One, Independent Variable Correlation Coefficients
Racial/Ethnic
Composition
per ZCTA
Racial/Ethnic
Composition
per ZCTA
Mean HH Income
per ZCTA
Pop. Percent w/
BS, BA, or Higher
per ZCTA
Total ZCTA Pop.,
18 and Older

Mean HH Income
per ZCTA

Pop. Percent w/
BA, BS, or Higher
per ZCTA

Total ZCTA
Pop. 18 and
Older

1

-.732

-.596

.218

-.732

1

.905

-.206

-.596

.905

1

-.094

.218

-.206

-.094

1

To supplement the first test, and overcome some of its limitations, I have
performed a second diagnostic. I have regressed each independent variable against all
other independent variables. (See Figure 12 for a summary of these results.) If the R2
value of a model approaches 1.0, then this serves as an indicator for the amount of
multicollinearity that exists between a set of independent variables. After performing this
diagnostic, it becomes apparent that two pairings are suspect. When the variables from
Model 2 (which include racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA; population percent with
BA, BS, or higher per ZCTA; and total ZCTA population, 18 and older) and Model Three
(which include racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA; mean household income per ZCTA;
and total ZCTA population, 18 and older) are regressed, their R2 values are .882 and .836,
respectively. This indicates a significant level of multicollinearity exists.
In a number of ways, results from the second multicollinearity test nuances the
results from the first one. While mean household income per ZCTA and education
attainment level per ZCTA are highly correlated, this relationship becomes more
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complicated when other variables are introduced. Test Two confirms that a significant
level of multicollinearity exists between all independent variables when both mean
household income per ZCTA and education attainment level per ZCTA become
dependent variables, but the degree of multicollinearity dwindles when race/ethnic
composition per ZCTA becomes the outcome. This suggests that the relationship between
income and education is muted in some instances when other mediating variables are
considered. As the models in Test Two show, racial/ethnic composition (alongside other
predictors) explains more variance of income and education, than do income and
education (alongside other predictors) explain racial/ethnic composition.
Figure 12. Multicollinearity Test Two, Regressions on Each Independent Variable
Outcome

Model Onea

Racial/Ethnic
Composition
per ZCTA
.561

Model Twob

Mean HH Income
per ZCTA

Pop. Percent w/
BA, BS, or Higher
per ZCTA

Total ZCTA
Pop. 18 and
Older

.882

Model Threec

.836

Model Fourd

.092
2

Note: Main entries are values of R , which measures levels of explained variance.
a
Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Mean Household Income per ZCTA; Population Percent
with BA, BS, or Higher per ZCTA; and Total ZCTA Population, 18 and Older.
b
Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA; Population
Percent with BA, BS, or Higher per ZCTA; and Total ZCTA Population, 18 and Older.
c
Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA; Mean Household
Income per ZCTA; and Total ZCTA Population, 18 and Older.
d
Independent variables included in this model are as follows: Racial/Ethnic Composition per ZCTA; Mean Household
Income per ZCTA; and Population Percent with BA, BS, or Higher per ZCTA.

Outcomes should not be interpreted in terms of a change in one particular
independent variable when multicollinearity exists. This, however, does not mean
independent variables have equal impacts in models where multicollinearity is present. In
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my models, it becomes clear that racial/ethnic measures are more salient in predicting
annual lottery revenues than class measures. Evidence for this is provided by comparing
new regression models that omit each of the independent variables included in the full
model (See Figure 13). In the third multicollinearity test, I present brief summaries of the
original models compared to these new models. Briefly let me discuss the results.
Figure 13. Multicollinearity Test Three, Regression Models of Lottery Sales per ZCTA*
Full Model
Education
Income
Race/Ethnicity
2,273,998
Tax Base Population
R2
Model Without Race/Ethnicity
Education
Income
Tax Base Population
R2
Model Without Income
Education
Race/Ethnicity
1,506,185
Tax Base Population
R2
Model Without Education
Income
Race/Ethncity
1,915,820
Tax Base Population
R2
N (ZCTAs)

FY 1999
-195,350
192
2,228,913

FY 2000
-193,243
193
2,329,109

FY 2001
-184,213
187
2,317,587

FY 2002
-189,289
189

194
.796

184
.788

179
.784

189
.762

-142,052
32
202
.607

-137,550
26
193
.582

-128,794
21
188
.571

-134,913
27
198
.570

-55,309
1,452,209

-52,400
1,547,958

-47,849
1,561,284

-50,851

172
.717

162
.708

158
.706

168
.687

-8
1,859,267

-4
1,963,449

-1
1,969,016

-4

169
.681

159
.676

155
.677

165
.657

25

25

25

25

Note: Main entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (B). Below each these coefficients are values of R2,
which measures levels of explained variance.

Test Three shows that racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA impacts the outcome
more than the other class variables. This is evident from each model’s level of explained
variance. The R2 value is consistently highest when this variable is included in the model,
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rather than excluded. Inclusion of the racial/ethnic variable adds approximately 20
percent more explained variance to the models, whereas inclusion of class variables only
add approximate 10 percent more explained variance to the models.
Another important finding to note in Table Three regards the unstandardized
coefficients. Notice that in all the models the coefficients for the racial/ethnic measure are
most reliable compared to the other variables’ coefficients. Its coefficient values
consistently range between 1.5 and 2.3 million in every model. The education coefficient,
on the other hand, erratically ranges in value from negative 200 thousand to negative 50
thousand. In other words, its lowest coefficient value is approximately four times smaller
than its highest coefficient value. Though the income coefficients also range broadly,
they poses unique problems of their own. The income coefficients are consistently
positive in value, except when education is excluded from the regression model. In this
particular model, the income coefficient value changes from a positive to negative value.
Such a change of sign is a common consequence when two variables in a regression
model are highly correlated. All these statistics taken together lend support to the notion
that racial/ethnic composition per ZCTA remains the most reliable and accurate measure
included in the models.
What does all this mean substantively? Exactly what I illustrate in Graphs Two
through Five. When class measures are held constant, increases in racial minority
representation translate into higher lottery sales. Communities of color contribute more to
education via the lottery tax than do communities predominantly comprised by whites.
Such an observation is consistent across all the regression models. Altogether, this lends
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evidence that the lottery is racially regressive source of state income irrespective of class
status.
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